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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
of any loss to the complainant.2 10 If the defendant failed to pay the
fine he could be imprisoned without any inquiry into his ability to
comply.211 A fine cannot be considered remedial in the absence of
loss. Nor can imprisonment be a valid method of coercion where
the defendant lacks the financial ability to comply with the court
order.
The procedure sought to be upheld by the State in Vail seri-
ously infringed upon the rights of judgment debtors who failed to
comply with show cause orders. The State's interest in rendering
enforceable judgments does not outweigh an individual's constitu-
tional right to due process. Hopefully, the legislature will act
quickly upon the recommendations of the Vail court and incorpo-
rate into the existing statutory framework safeguards sufficient to
protect the interests of all parties involved.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Prior judgment available as defense but not counterclaim in summary
proceeding for rent.
In actions by landlords for nonpayment of rent, the New York
courts have exhibited an increasing awareness of the need to pro-
tect tenants' rights.2 12 Recently, in Myack v. Aruca,2 13 Judge Harba-
ter of the New York City Civil Court, Queens County, addressed
the question whether a tenant can interpose a prior New York
judgment as a setoff in his landlord's action for rent. The court
concluded that while the tenant could not assert the earlier judg-
ment as a counterclaim, he was entitled to raise the earlier judg-
ment as a defense since it could be equated with partial payment of
the rent due.214 Judge Harbater believed the interposition of the
2 1
1 See note 198 supra.
211 See note 199 supra.
212 In New York and other jurisdictions, the rights of tenants are continually being
expanded. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(warranty of habitability implied in all leases by operation of law; breach thereof gives rise to
normal remedies for breach of contract); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.
2d 681 (Rockland County Ct. 1975) (lease provision requiring tenants to pay additional sum
as rent upon commencement of any proceeding by landlord, irrespective of landlord's
success, held unconscionable); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (tenants may raise defenses against payment where
landlord has violated law so as to substantially affect habitability of premises); Note,Judicial
Expansion of Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residen-
tial Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 489 (1971); Comment, Tenant Remedies for a Denial of
Essential Services and for Harassment - The Nen York Approach, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 66
(1972).
213 174 N.Y.LJ. 105, Dec. 2, 1975, at 9, col. 3 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County).
214 Id., at cols. 3-4.
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counterclaim was precluded by CPLR 5014 which codifies New
York's long-existing policy2" 5 of limiting the right to bring an
action on a money judgment entered in a court of this state.2" 6
Designed to prevent multiplicity of lawsuits and to shield judgment
debtors from harassment, 21 7 CPLR 5014 provides that an action
on a money judgment between the original parties will be per-
mitted only in three instances: (1) where 10 years have elapsed
since the judgment was originally docketed; (2) where the judg-
ment was entered by default and the summons was served other
than by personal delivery; or (3) where the court in its discretion
deems that such an action is proper.
The landlord in Myack brought a summary proceeding against
his tenant on an undisputed claim for unpaid rent in the amount
of $298.36. The defendant tenant, however, had previously ob-
tained a judgment against the landlord for $223.20 which he
wished to offset against the rent due.218 The landlord contended
that the tenant's prior judgment in the small claims court could not
be asserted as either a setoff or a counterclaim. 219 Noting that this
was a question of first impression, the court ruled that the tenant
could not counterclaim on the judgment because a counterclaim
constitutes a cause of action, 220 and CPLR 5014 restricts the right
2I CPLR 5014 is substantially the same as its predecessor in the CPA. See CPA 484; 5
WK&M 5014.02.2
'
6 See 174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, cols. 3-4. A cause of action on ajudgment not entered in a
New York State court is not subject to the restrictions imposed by CPLR 5014. See, e.g.,
Molea v. Eppler, 97 N.Y.S.2d 222 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1950) (counterclaim permitted on
judgment entered in New York federal court); cf. Morton v. Palmer, 14 N.Y.S. 912 (Sup. Ct.
1st Dep't 1891) (restriction of action on judgment inapplicable to judgment of federal court
sitting in New York). See also 5 WK&M 5014.01. This is because judgments of any courts
outside New York, if entitled to full faith and credit, "may be enforced either by filing in the
office of a county clerk or by an action." Id., at 50-201. If such a judgment is entered in New
York, however, CPLR 5014 would presumably govern its subsequent enforcement. Id.
217 5 WK&M 5014.01, at 50-200. In Rando v. National Park Bank, 137 App. Div. 190,
191-92, 121 N.Y.S. 1048, 1049 (1st Dep't 1910), the court observed that allowing an action
on a judgment may be of no value to the judgment creditor, may be oppressive to the
judgment debtor because of the recovery of additional costs, and may result in a continuous
stream of judgments based on the same underlying cause.
218 174 N.Y.LJ. 105, at 9, col. 3. RPAPL § 743 permits the interposition of most
defenses or counterclaims in a summary proceeding. The types of defenses and coun-
terclaims which may be interposed are many and varied. See, e.g., Cornell v. Dimmick, 73
Misc. 2d 384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Binghamton City Ct. 1973) (retaliatory eviction is valid
defense to summary dispossess proceeding); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318
N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (landlord's violation affecting habitability of
the premises is valid defense to nonpayment proceeding); 2300 Concourse Realty Corp. v.
Klug, 201 Misc. 179, 111 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. Bronx County 1952) (landlord's
commingling of tenant's security deposit justifies tenant's counterclaim for its return).
219 174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, col. 3.
220 CPLR 3019(a) provides in pertinent part that "[a] counterclaim may be any cause of
action in favor of one or more defendants ... against one or more plaintiffs .... See also
Mook v. Merdinger, 18 App. Div. 2d 983, 238 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Ist Dep't 1963) (mem.)
(counterclaim must state a cause of action).
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to bring a cause of action on a judgment to certain limited circum-
stances not found in the present situation. 221 Judge Harbater dis-
posed of the case by declaring that the prior judgment was the
equivalent of payment and therefore was available as a defense to
the landlord's claim for rent. Accordingly, the court granted the
tenant his setoff in the amount of the earlier judgment and
awarded the landlord the balance of the rent due.222
In reaching its decision, the court apparently failed to consider
the fact that CPLR 5014 also permits an action on a judgment
where it is deemed appropriate in the court's discretion. 223 It is
surprising that the court indulged in the fiction of equating a prior
judgment with the defense of payment 22 4 when it could have
achieved the same result by exercising its discretionary power and
allowing a counterclaim on the tenant's judgment.225 Since the
tenant in Myack had apparently been unable to enforce his judg-
ment by conventional procedures,226 the case seems particularly
appropriate for the court's exercise of its discretionary power
under CPLR 5014.227 Moreover, public policy considerations un-
derlying the restriction of actions on judgments, viz the avoidance
221 174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, cols. 3-4.
2221 d., col. 4.
221 See CPLR 5014(3). Since this discretionary provision is rarely invoked, few guidelines
have been developed concerning what factors will motivate a court to deem that an action on
a judgment is appropriate. It has been observed, however, that the use of discretion would
be appropriate when all other alternatives have proven inadequate in securing payment for
the judgment creditor. 5 WK&M 5014.06.
224 The most obvious legal defense in a nonpayment proceeding is payment of the
amount due. See, e.g., Hite v. Haley, 188 N.Y.S. 906 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1921); Levy v.
Winkler, 59 Misc. 482, 110 N.Y.S. 997 (App. T. 1908). Payment of less than the whole
amount due will result in a setofffor the amount paid. Ferris v. Rashbaum, 42 N.Y.S.2d 363
(App. T. Ist Dep't 1943). The Myack court's equation of a prior judgment with the defense
of payment, however, is a novel position. The court itself indicated that a tenant's prior
judgment had never before been deemed to constitute the defense of payment. See 174
N.Y.LJ. 105, at 9, col. 3.
22 Had the Myack court exercised its discretion and permitted the counterclaim on the
judgment, the counterclaim would apparently have fulfilled all other procedural require-
ments. First, it would have met the requirement that it be against the landlord in the same
individual capacity that he held in the prior action. See, e.g., Grierson v. Wagar, 78 Misc. 2d
479, 357 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1974). See also Ehrlich v. American
Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Co., 26 N.Y.2d 255, 257 N.E.2d 890, 309 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1970);
3 WK&M 3019.02. Second, even though counterclaims are subject to being severed if they
are so unrelated as to be disruptive, see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, commentary at 216
(1974), this dearly would not have presented a problem in Myack since the prior action arose
out of the landlord-tenant relationship, see 174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, col. 3, and since the claims
involved were of a very simple nature.
226 174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, cols. 3, 4. Additionally, the Myack court noted that the tenant's
prior judgment was awarded in small claims court and that such judgments are particularly
difficult to collect. Id., col. 4. For more detailed discussions of this problem, see Driscoll, DE
MINIMIS CURAT LEX -Small Claims Courts in New York City, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 479,
501-03 (1974); Comment, The Nature and Operation of the Neu, York Small Claims Courts, 38
ALBANY L. REv. 196 (1974).
.
27 See note 223 supra.
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of harassment of judgment debtors and multiplicity of suits, are in
no way frustrated by permitting a tenant to counterclaim in an
action commenced by the landlord.
A possible explanation for the court's action is suggested by
the fact that the holding is limited to judgments which are "equal to
or less than the amount of rent due. ' 2 8 It is submitted that the
court wished to provide a tenant with a remedy which would serve
only as a defense in a nonpayment proceeding, rather than grant a
counterclaim which would result in affirmative relief in situations
wherein the prior judgment exceeds the landlord's rent claim.2 2 9
Under either theory, the result in Myack would have been the same
since the judgment involved did not exceed the rent due. Never-
theless, the court's endorsement of the latter approach would have
been more consistent with the current trend towards greater tenant
rights. 230 Although the Myack court clearly recognized the need for
affording tenants greater rights and flexibility in enforcing judg-
ments against their landlords, the court did not go far enough. The
practitioner who represents a tenant in a situation similar to Myack
should certainly attempt to use a prior judgment as a defense of
payment. Where the judgment is greater than the amount of rent
owing, however, the practitioner would be well advised to request
the court to exercise its discretion and allow the tenant's coun-
terclaim on the previously obtained judgment.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE
Judicial and legislative pronouncements on citizen-taxpayer standing.
The adjudication of legal interests is governed in part by the
shifting contours of constitutional and institutional standing re-
quirements. Directed at the party seeking access to the judicial
process, the standing doctrine reflects the judiciary's insistence on
an adversary presentation and its interpretation of the proper
228 174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, col. 4 (emphasis in original).
229 The basic difference between a defense and a counterclaim is that a defense "look[s]
only to defeating the plaintiffs claim," 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3018, commentary at 152
(1974), whereas a counterclaim is proper "whether it will merely diminish or defeat the relief
sought by the plaintiff or it seeks to recover an amount in excess of the plaintiff's claim." 3
WK&M 3019.02, at 30-427.
In Molea v. Eppler, 97 N.Y.S.2d 222 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1950), a defendant tenant
asserted a counterclaim on a 'prior federal judgment which exceeded the landlord's claim,
and the court simply offset the rent due against the prior judgment and granted the tenant a
judgment for the excess. The Myack court noted that but for the fact that Molea involved a
prior federal judgment not subject to the restrictions of CPLR 5014, see note 216 supra, it
would have been persuasive precedent. -174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, col. 4.
230 See note 212 and accompanying text supra.
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